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Abstract 
Taking a child’s behavior as an example (out of my own experience), 
I shall try to consider a theoretical framework on which a semiotic model can 
be established. This can, in my opinion, be performed owing to the fact that 
semiotics initially establishes a relation between two (or more than two) 
phenomena, which can then be subordinated to a process of signification.  
My aim in this paper shall be to establish a theoretical limit to such 
oppositional relations in terms of a child’s behavior (such as: normality vs. 
abnormality, intentionality vs. unintentionality, etc.), which may emerge 
from various states of a mental disorders such as Autism presents. Such 
states can gain their transformability through procedures such as: 
transformation in semiotics, and new behavior acquisition in psychology, so 
as to become moveable from one state to another. The questions I am trying 
to answer are: are such phenomena treatable in terms of their becoming 
passionate?  If an abnormal behavior comes into existence, how is it 
expressed through the incapacity of the “symbolic representation,” as Piaget 
claims? And finally, which is the way to understand such a child’s’ requests 
and complaints?  
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Introduction – On some semiotic concepts as an interactional process 
Treating human behavior generally, and states of mental disorders 
specifically, as a special kind of a relationship, (among individuals, intended 
in a social context, or in certain social groups), and its respective 
meaningfulness (in the sense of an appropriate inter-communicational 
process in growth), gives me a scientific and methodological reason to 
discuss such a phenomenon within semiotics as a discipline.  If semiotics 
treats dichotomies among other issues, especially in the frames of 
linguistically-minded and/or psychologically minded semiotics, (taking into 
account its cognitive part as well), then one should consider it as a starting 
point. Instances of such an analysis—and/or theoretical paradigm—can by 
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all means be found within the Structural and Post-structural periods within 
the general evolutionary linguistics of science’s developmental and historical 
periods.  Such dichotomies or dualities have been overcome today in the 
frames of the growth flow of general signs, as we shall try to explicate, 
creating thus various analytical levels of the semiotic method, which are able 
to provide for a decent deduction of meaning, generally, as one of the 
principal goals of the process of semiosis.  
We all behave in determined ways: some ways are well-known, 
accepted and socially acceptable on one hand, whereas others are not. They 
may simply be specific, or a characteristic of certain individuals who might 
be an exception to the external social reality surrounding them. If such a 
dichotomy comes into existence, then one should be firm in claiming that it 
by all means represents a semiotic discourse.   
 Establishing such a duality as a starting point, as to whether one acts 
normally or not in turn, represents a firm ground for the known semiotic 
systems which should  be communicating, so as to  process signs. The 
question one has to pose is this: how can one make such systems (which may 
represent contradictoriness, disjunction, conjunction, etc.) represent an 
accomplished interactional process?  
 Besides the so-called equivocal and/or proportionally accomplished 
communicational and/or informational process (Shannon & Weaver, 1948), 
which in turn is seen as an idealistic process,  an unequivocal one may exist. 
This is the one which does not simply comply in an equal proportion with the 
transmitted material (from the source to the destination). In other words, the 
messages transmitted from one side of the communicational channel to the 
other do not represent equality in proportion. 32 
 Semiotics has argued about artistic categories and expressions which 
may represent such transmitted unequivocal messages. In such a case, the 
results become multifold and poly-semantic, and then are ready for optional 
choices. A reader, viewer, or a critic can then choose as a consequence which 
meaning or meanings shall be useful for him or her, so as to be able to 
interpret a work of art individually.  
 Our next question then is: how should the processing of such 
messages appear within inter- and intra- human behavior? What if such 
behavior is not regarded as normal? Can it then create relations so as to 
become a part of a system and /or a structure which may be semiotically 
treatable?  It is in conclusion true that such a disproportionality (except for 
the mentioned semiotically treatable spheres, in terms of their precision of 
                                                          
32 The notion of unequivocal messages has been widely treated by Eco. See: (Eco, 1975). It 
is to note however, that such an unequivocal message can be realistically transmitted either 
verbally or non-verbally. One may exemplify Jakobson’s contribution in this context. See: 
(Innis, 1985) 
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results), can belong to social surroundings or, seen in another semiotic sense, 
to the text/context relationship.  
 My aim in this paper is to establish a theoretical framework to such 
oppositional or relational components of a child’s behavior, which are likely 
to emerge from various states of a mental disorder, such as Autism Spectrum 
Disorder Syndrome. Such states, which are seemingly  intended as a 
physiological state (due to their organic order) can gain a changeability of 
their status through procedures (such as transformation in semiotics, and a 
gradual or a procedural acquisition of new behavior in psychology),  to the 
extent that they become “moveable” from one state  to another.  If such a 
thesis is taken to be true, then, besides the formal analysis of determined 
semiotic objects, semiotics can present such phenomena on epistemological 
grounds (initially based on hypotheses aimed at their manifestation), in an 
attempt to make such mentioned states applicable into various analytical 
levels.  Abstract notions then can obtain the possibility of their optionality, 
so as to become concrete: at least,  according to semiotic preconditions such 
as are applied by the semiotics of passions  (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille,  
1993).  The issues that semiotics should raise in such a context are of the 
following kind: how should such relational attitudes (among which, a 
strange kind of child’s behavior), become passionate in their final 
manifestation status, and why?  Or, on another level: is the contradiction 
between such taxonomic entities as normality and abnormality (thus, 
attempting to exemplify autism, and/ or other similar phenomena or 
syndromes) based on its clear-cut limits, or is a transformational process in 
the semiotic sense of the word competent and necessary for the gradualness 
of procedures? One of my methodological aims, as I hope will be evident, is 
the applicability of the theoretical postulates I shall try to present.  
  
Out of my own experience: a child’s strange behavior 
It is a firmly established fact that each one of us lives in a determined 
social context. Such a context should, in turn, be culturally understandable, 
adoptable, so as to be ready to create relations and correlations which are a 
part of a semiotic discourse. Each such exception can be noticeable, 
therefore even semiotically treatable, in the sense, as we shall soon see, of 
creating different kinds of semiotically transformable units. 33 
Exceptional or extraordinary behavior can be noticed since early 
childhood.  A frequent problem however is that a parent would not know 
what it is. Questions of the following kind may arise: “Why doesn’t my child 
                                                          
33 The term transformation and/or transformational shall have two kinds of its 
conceptualizing here: one shall belong to the procedures used in the semiotic procedures, 
and the next the process of gradualness, aimed at a behavioral change in terms of different 
discussed items.   
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speak? Why does he/she walk on the top of his/her toes? Why doesn’t he/she 
make or maintain eye-contact?”  Such an exceptional reality, as I may be 
encouraged to name it, creates a new reality, a brand new one, such as 
science may attempt to create. Semiotically speaking, when one finds oneself 
at the stage of signification (adding meaning to a given form), one should 
talk of the world of possibilities, or a possible world (Eco, 1994). Even 
though Eco here speaks of different contexts taken from the artistic and/or 
fictive reality, is it not then true that such a circumstance can realistically 
occur? Is it not then true that a child with mental disorders can live or be in a 
context of his or her own world? Both “worlds” mentioned, understandably, 
lie in different contexts, one of them being of a scientific nature, and the next 
being subject to a metaphorical usage.  Let me try to exemplify this: a 
possible world or a world of possibilities can, for Eco, be a flow of events 
and actions happening in a work of art.  What he wishes to say is, that the 
real author of the work (Eco, 1994) wished that a certain story be taken from 
external reality and be put his own way, an aesthetic way, which gives to him 
openness within its interpretation (Eco, 1962). A child, who lives in his or 
her own world, lives another context, which as we have said is exceptional, 
extraordinary and unusual. In conclusion, a child’s own world is a concept of 
a metaphorical usage, so as to indicate his or her behavior, simply, which 
may not seem normal. A child’s being a part of such a world is defined in the 
following way: 
 Autistic disorder or autism is a severe developmental disorder 
characterized by abnormalities in social functioning, language and 
communication, and unusual behaviors and interests. It touches every aspect 
of the child’s interaction with his or her world, involves many parts of the 
brain, and undermines the traits that make us human – our social 
responsiveness, ability to communicate, and feelings for other people. 
(Mash, Eric J., Wolfe 2004, 284) 
 In such a context, being aware of another context, which may not 
comply with the “text,” both a child’s parent and indeed the semiotctian 
would have to ask: is such children are acting a part of their normal behavior 
or not? Initially, a twofold complex answer can be offered. A parent might 
react as follows: “My child is a quiet child, never makes noise, or does the 
other things like other children do. I feel it is just all right. What, though, is 
happening now?” 
 The next answer should lie on the semiotic level, posing questions of 
the following kind: why doesn’t such a subject—taken as a semiotic object of 
analysis—at this instance comply with its context? Should it have a 
relational attitude so that the necessary binary opposition as a starting point 
is created, thus becoming a part of the semiotic discourse?  Such a vision, 
which semiotically speaking aims at attributing signification (or at least, 
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performing such a process), should create a system similar to the child’s 
gradual acquisition and developmental stages.  Later in this paper I shall try 
to present both aspects simultaneously, so as to reach the necessary 
preconditions for the mentioned application and signification process.  
 Noticing such differences (in comparison to other children) as I have 
mentioned above, the fear starts growing to the extent that new emotional 
statuses start to prevail within parents. The de-socialization process, 
sometimes gradually, and other times instantly, is what a parent can notice: 
the unusual playing with his/her toys; stereotypical and or repetitive 
behavior; the lack of imaginative games; or a medicament which may be 
suspected for causing such a behavior; etc., cause despair and 
disappointment within parents to the extent of emotional passion. Such a 
situation (which, as we have said, is definitely semiotically treatable), shall 
cause a specialist of the field to mediate a communication process between 
the parent and the child.  And, finally, what does a parent do to the child so 
as to behave abnormally instead of normally? 
 The relationship between text and context, as mentioned above, is 
one of the problems. It is even for us—who are at least considered normal—
true: why there is a certain amount of fear in us prior to our 
contextualization, or adapting to brand new circumstances?  This question 
naturally applies to the uncertainty problem  (Griffin, 2003) in the 
occurrence of new circumstances.  
 The next problem is the mentioned semiotic process of oppositional 
relations. This is definitely due to some of the necessary “automatic” 
processes occurring in the human brain, which are biologically, 
linguistically, psychologically and philosophically conditioned. Let us 
examine now each posed problem separately. 
 
On the binary oppositions of the semiotic process 
Owing to the fact that binary oppositions have been used widely 
(either theoretically or within their practical applicability) in the frames of 
the Structural approach to linguistics, we shall refer to them in this part of 
this contribution, in order to be able to exemplify such notions as 
communicating and speech abilities within a child’s development . Such 
issues (especially studied in linguistics and psychology) shall help us reach 
the level of a possible applicability and manifestation of meaningful units 
within semiotics as a discipline.  
 Saussure’s contribution, for instance, gives us one of semiotics’ 
definitions.  (Saussure, 2011) Defining semiotics as a “science of signs” 
(paraphrase mine), in Saussurian terms makes it a part of social psychology, 
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and consequently of general psychology.34 One issue needs to be clarified 
here: why does Saussure make semiotics a part of psychology? For a simple 
reason: semiotics has to do with on-going processes, either communicational 
or linguistic (at least, during Structuralism), in the same way as does 
psychology. Another problem which Saussure addressed is the double 
articulation as, for instance, explained by Martine. Such a phenomenon, 
naturally, belongs to linguistics only.  In such a context, the first articulation 
belongs to phonology (the shapes of the sounds of language and their usage), 
and the second one to meaning. As can be observed, one of such dichotomies 
gets disclosed at this instance. 
 Another of Saussure’s theses, which we consider important for this 
part of our contribution, is the dichotomy between language and speech.  
One may conclude with confidence that the first one considers linguistic 
norms and the next pronunciation, which is due to our psycho-physic 
abilities; or, better expressed, the first phenomenon is an abstract and the 
next a concrete phenomenon.  Both concepts should act within their 
complementariness, so as to function as one. After all, Saussure 
comprehends language as a social phenomenon, or indeed as a brand new 
reality (containing in itself the known linguistic norms, which are applied in 
a determined language’s system). Saussure’s claim that language is only one 
of the semiotic systems (my paraphrase) is a firm argument in relation to such 
an issue.  
 Another dichotomy considered by Saussure (and many other 
scholars) is the signifier and the signified. This, as can be logically 
concluded, implies another important issue in semiotics: the representation 
itself, and the representational issues. 35  
 The sign should signify and/or represent something else. In other 
words, this dichotomy is also a part of the communicational process. The 
sign can further be motivated or chaotic, in terms of its intentionality or 
unintentionality. If it is motivated, it is designed to motivate something else, 
in order to make it understandable, or add a meaning to it.  In sum, this is the 
beginning of the signification process in semiotics as such. The question one 
has to advance now is the following: what do such dichotomies have to do 
with behavioral impairments in a child’s development? It is immediately 
apparent that more than one answer can be given. 
 First, the compounding or uniting of external reality with mental 
reality (visually, receptively, non-verbally or verbally), is always a problem 
in terms of individuals with mental disorders (such as is ASD). Second, 
semiotics’ binary oppositions allow a comprehension of the gradualness of 
                                                          
34 The paraphrasing is mine. See: (Saussure, 2011) .  
35 See: (Peirce, 1960) 
European Scientific Journal   May 2014  edition vol.10, No.14   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
218 
such a union, which in conclusion should create what we call language usage 
today. If such complex processes as perception of the external reality, its 
reception, comprehension, and finally its expressivity (or, semiotically 
speaking, its signification), are seen as separate units, they make up the 
universe of signs, which gradually in semiotics (and procedurally and/or 
developmentally in psychology), obtains a manifestation level, or its 
expression, becoming thus meaningful. This would, in other words, be part 
of a normal social context.  
 Finally, reference, symbolic reference, reception and feed-back 
information are clue concepts either for a normal or an abnormal child’s 
behavior. Indeed, it is here that semiotics is important for a child’s 
development: 
At the end of the sensori-motor period, at about one and half to two 
years, there appears a function that is fundamental to the development of 
later behavioral patterns. It consists in the ability to represent something (a 
signified something: object, event, conceptual scheme, etc.) by means of a 
“signifier” which is differentiated and which serves only a representative 
purpose: language, mental image, symbolic gesture, and so on. (Piaget 1969, 
Chapter 3, n.p. ) 
One can see the dichotomy in the text. What Piaget intends here, as a 
matter of fact, is exactly the semiotic process which is going on in the 
developmental stages of the child.  The ability to represent what ones sees,  
as well as to manifest it within on-going biological processes through verbal 
or non-verbal communication, is as what a child has to do at this stage, 
although, as Piaget says (ibid.), still without a clear signification.  The 
semiotic process, as we have seen, is exactly this: conceptualizing or 
thinking in other realities as well, such as illusionary, imagined ones, and/or 
artistic ones. Here is why Piaget calls this function, in fact, a semiotic 
function. 
However, since linguists distinguish between “symbols” and “signs”, 
we would do better to adopt their term “semiotic function” to designate those 
activities having to do with differentiated signifiers as a whole.(Piaget 1969, 
Chapter 3, n.p. )  
There is no doubt that we may state that the differences between the 
concepts in question belong to the semiotic discourse. In the wider 
understanding of the sign concept in semiotics for instance, the smallest or 
most basic unit of analysis can be intended. The sign, however, as is 
generally known, can have various shapes, and definitively be a subject to a 
multifold deduction of meaning.  It can, further, indicate meaning, as in the 
case of hearing a rumor and guessing what it is. If one (for instance) sees 
smoke, one can think of a cigarette, even without visualizing it, etc.  Further 
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processes of adding meaning to a given object/ subject, naturally overcome 
the perception stage and may be a part of cognition as well.36  
Children with ASD syndrome usually have a delay within such 
processes, which can be instanced in terms of the delay of speech, perception 
and especially cognition processes. A child with autism might cognize the 
objects around him/her, but not essentially. As we have seen in Saussure and 
Piaget, something may be indicative to him/her as representing something 
else, but not in terms of its function. Taking (for instance) objects and 
putting them into his/her mouth indicates that there is some kind of 
representation, but not yet a symbolic one. As one could further observe in 
Piaget’s explanation (Piaget, 1969), the uniting and compounding (with 
notions such as imitation game, image, movements, etc.) happens somewhat  
later than the stages  he names “representational”. The delay in children with 
ASD syndrome lies in their incapacity of performing such “tasks” at the due 
biological age.  
 
On some passions of the children with ASD Syndrome  
As we have stated above, instead of acquiring the basic knowledge of 
the world around, and the various objects in terms of their conceptualizing 
and differentiating in various categories and states, in short, of the social 
surroundings, a child with mental disorders can acquire only some of them. 
Advancing in some spheres, but not in all of them, is usually a characteristic 
of a child living with autism. Repetitive actions and/or habits (for instance, 
playing with one toy only, and purposing it to unusual aims in the 
manifestation status) make such a child’s symptoms visible to the rest of the 
world.  Such actions may then become passionate, and can express 
emotionality such as happiness, anger, disagreement etc. Prior to their 
becoming passionate they express their needs and complaints, in an attempt 
to initiate a normal functioning.  I call them passionate, because of the 
mentioned repetitions (as if wanting to say, wanting to wish, wanting to 
utter)37 which, as we said, would not look normal to the rest of the world. If 
such actions do contain their meaning—either hypothetically imagined in the 
child’s brain and/or in his/her realistically perceived context—then one can 
definitely provide a semiotic model to present them.  Such a kind of a child’s 
expressivity (or, pretended expressivity, or attempt of expressing 
                                                          
36 We have to remind ourselves here that semiotics in turn, does not only regard its processes 
as psychological. The vision I have exemplified here, applies by all means to the initial steps 
of signification. By all means, differing from such a claim, one can infer meaning through 
semiotics, as rightfully shown in Peirce. See: (Peirce, 1960). In terms of the ASD syndrome, 
such a representational status can be applicable to the later developmental behavior patterns 
of a child and/or an individual.  
37 After all,  Greimas’s and Fontanille’s concept of modality is a proof to that.  
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himself/herself), at least in terms of presenting his/her necessities to the rest 
of the world, is by all means semiotically treatable. The way of their 
compensation of the normal actions with abnormal ones can also be made 
visible and understandable through the signs he/she is processing in a special 
way. It should be emphasized in turn that such a procedure must rely on 
paradigmatic and syntagmatic juxtaposition at the semio-narrative level.  
The semiotics of passions (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille,  1993) bases 
human activity, human creation, social phenomena etc., on discursive and 
epistemological grounds. Greimas himself (A. J. Greimas, 1987), above all, 
has introduced the subject as a part of the semiotic process. This would 
justify introducing the semiotics of action: 
 It is therefore not surprising that the best-explored, and perhaps the 
most efficient, level of the generative trajectory is, in fact, situated in the 
middle area between its discursive and epistemological components. We are 
referring above all to the modeling of narrativity and to its actantial 
organization. The concept of an actant, freed from its psychological frame 
and defined only by its doing is the sine qua non condition for developing a 
semiotics of action.(A. J. Greimas and Fontanille 1993, XVII-XVIII) 
The questions we have to pose now are the following: can a child 
with an ASD Syndrome have (possess) narration within his brain, even 
though not manifesting it expressively? 38 Or: if a child with an ASD 
Syndrome cannot speak (or does not hold the verbal component) and 
perform other psychological processes, can he/she express himself/herself 
otherwise, in terms of the mentioned biological and psychological processes?  
Here is one such possibility: 
One of the most profound mysteries of autism has been the 
remarkable ability of most autistic people to excel at visual spatial skills 
while performing so poorly verbal skills. When I was a child and a teenager I 
thought everybody thought in pictures. I had no idea that my thought 
processes were different. In fact, I did not realize the full extent of the 
difference until very recently. At meetings and at work I started asking other 
people detailed questions about how they accessed information from their 
memories. From their answers I learned that my visualization exceeded those 
of other people. (Grandin 2008, n.p. ) 
If such is the visualization process of an autistic person, it means that 
such visualization is ready to create narrative structures.  The question is of a 
semiotic nature. It should express relations.  In terms of a possible passionate 
taxonomy, it would require that ready-given narrative structures are 
manifested, either to the deep or surface structures. Such taxonomic notion 
transformability is possible within the mentioned model, with the aim of 
                                                          
38 They don’t because of the impossibility to use oral communication. 
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changeability or “movement” from one state to another. If the passions of a 
child with ASD Syndrome are placed within their state of affairs, the 
procedure within the manifestation level produces their transformability into 
the state of feelings.  This, in conclusion, is one of the ways to make such a 
child’s actions meaningful (at least in the frames of their “physiologically 
intended” context).  
The questions we have to resolve now are of a twofold nature:  which 
would be related to the creation of such mentioned narrative structures, 
which would be related to a passionate taxonomy, and which would finally 
emerge as a result?  The second part of the question can also otherwise be 
formed: why should such stereotypical actions of a child having (or, 
suspected to have) a mental disorder, be considered passionate?  The answers 
to such questions naturally, require a procedural approach and applicability 
within the semiotic method.  
The clue question the parent often poses, however, is the following: 
“which is the way to understand such a child’s needs and complaints so as to 
be able to properly provide him/her with due interaction?”  It is 
understandable that in normal surroundings such an interaction represents a 
developmental process (either biologically or psychologically) which a 
parent is able to comprehend. In order to be able to see how an interaction 
should be processed within an autistic child, one should examine some ways 
of treating autism. 
 
On some possibilities to treat autism 
If one wishes to perform an application model, based on an autistic 
child’s passions, with the aim of its semiotic relevance, one has to be aware 
of some of the possibilities to treat such a phenomenon.  This is, in my view, 
due to several reasons: 
1) A child with autism is considered to show abnormal behavior, as 
generally known, instead of normal behavior. 
2) Such a child produces repetitive actions (which may be due to 
several processes occurring within his/her brain, such as 
perception and cognition capabilities). 
3) Such habits, and/or interactional relations, can finally become 
passionate, in the way of inadequate information processing. 
If such a situation is taken to be true, then a key question is posed: 
how should such an interactional process become possible, taking such 
issues into account?  Or, perhaps better expressed: if such biological and 
psychological processes are not regarded as normal, what would then be their 
semiotic status? It is understandable I hope that a semiotic process requires a 
fundamental processing on both sides of the communication channel (in case 
one takes the communicative level as a fundamental one).  Due to such 
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reasons, it is the therapist who intervenes in terms of the learning and 
acquiring process, thus mediating and/or assisting the child’s developmental 
progress. 39 In an attempt to exemplify possibilities of treating a child living 
with autism, I shall mention only some of them, especially those which have 
to do with behavioral impairments.  This is due to the following reasons: 
The picture of autism treatment is further complicated by the fact that 
there are very different perspectives from which to view treatment: 
developmental, behavioral, educational, cognitive, and medical. These 
perspectives overlap, but each emphasizes different things. Practitioners 
from these different perspectives often don't understand one another's 
vocabularies. It is like blind men feeling the elephant from different parts of 
the animal and getting very different impressions of the creature. What we 
will do here is cross disciplinary boundaries and integrate different 
perspectives by stripping away terminology that delineates and separates 
perspectives and instead focus on the mechanics of what to do to carry out 
treatment, based on research, theory, and clinical experience (Siegel 2003, 3) 
 Owing to the fact that the ASD problem is multi-dimensional (either 
in terms of the child’s developmental stages or within his/her organic, i.e. 
bio-neurological context), I shall mention here only some of the treatment 
possibilities in close relation to such a child’s behavior. The initial stage 
(Mash, Eric J., Wolfe, 2004) would comprise the following: 
 Initially, treatment focuses on building rapport and teaching the child 
learning-readiness skills. Various procedures help the child feel comfortable 
being physically close to the therapist and to identify rewards to strengthen 
the child’s social behavior, affection, and play. Imitating the child’s use to 
toys may increase eye contact, touching, vocalizations directed toward the 
therapist. Prompting the child to engage in play with a preferred toy may 
decrease social avoidance. (Mash, Eric J., Wolfe 2004, 306) 
 Here basic behavioral treatment is necessary, as we have previously 
noted, because of the lack of “social responsiveness.”40 Including the 
therapist in a possible establishing an interactional process with the child is 
by all means semiotically relevant. In terms of establishing actantial relations 
in this sense (between parents and children), I shall call the therapist an 
active subject and/ or a knowable subject,  who, in terms of the 
transformability of the semiotic process itself towards a manifestation status, 
may procedurally change its shape.  In such a fashion, the epistemological 
grounds of a semiotics of passions can render the process possible and 
applicable. (A. J. Greimas and Fontanille,  1993) 
                                                          
39 In this case, as can be noticed, due to the child’s impairments, an interactional process 
shall be achieved through the therapist. We insist on this scheme because of the participants 
in such a process: this would finally make the process semitiocally possible.  
40 See:(Mash, Eric J., Wolfe, 2004) 
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 Instancing such an action, in this specific case performed by the 
therapist, can provide for establishing a communicational process with the 
child. The mediating of the active subject (which in other semiotic context 
may be of an imagined nature) enables such a process. If such a process is 
already started (preferably in an early age of the child), not only 
psychologically, but also semiotically, one can speak of the manifestation 
status applied.  Logically, the next question is how to make such passionate 
actions or activities of the child identifiable, so as to start the 
aspectualization process of his interests as a starting point for their 
transformability into a state of feelings.  
 
Towards a conclusion: a developmental passionate taxonomy within a 
child’s behavior 
Instead of instancing a child’s typical behavior, which certainly 
should be in accordance to his biological age, one has to think of his/her 
atypical and /or stereotypical behavior. Certain movements, wishes and 
desires, ways of requesting and complaining, become repetitive and 
pervasive for such children. This can be explained by the fact of their ability 
to compensate actions with other actions which normally they would wish to 
perform. If certain actions of such children are repetitive, it means they can 
be substitutable: this can definitely justify the syntagmatic axis in terms of 
the application method. The problem of the applicability of the semiotic 
method here then appears within the nature of compensating for such a 
disability (or such determined atypical and/or stereotypical) behavior of the 
child.  This foreseen difficulty in various analyzed social contexts represents, 
among other issues, the skeptical component in this sense of the word. This 
definitely arguments the epistemological ground of such a method.  [ See:  
(A. J. Greimas and Fontanille,  1993) and (Goldman, 1986) ] 
 For instance, instead of performing a simple game, an imaginative 
game (which as we said is characteristic within a certain developmental stage 
of the child), he/she compensates by another similar interest and /or ability, 
or an ability which might have another nature (such as, physical capabilities 
which might overcome the appropriate biological age of the child).  In 
applying a semiotic style in such a fashion, one should bear in mind as well 
the unequivocal messages mentioned or, otherwise stated: the tensitivity 
component needs certain actions done or performed by the active subject, so 
as to reach the aspectualization possibility, instanced in Greimas and 
Fotanille (1993) by their modality in action.  In terms of such a procedural 
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transformability (as we stated gradually, instead of instantly), one should 
exemplify the semiotic squares. 41 
 Initially, one should be aware of the fact, that the interpersonal 
communication process between a parent and a child with ASD is either 
incomplete, partial, or from time to time, even impossible. Otherwise, based 
on the parents’ experience, one should learn some of such children’s 
requests and complaints. In such a case, a lack of meaning is what occurs; 
simply because of the fact that a mutual process of acquisition should occur: 
either by the side of the child or of the parent.  One should conclude then, 
that the relation between the child and the parent represents a disjunction. 
The inclusion of the therapist, as we said, attempts an establishing of a 
communication process between the two. He or she is therefore in a relation 
of conjunction with the child. Out of such a situation, the first concept the 
parent faces, is despair.  It should be understandable that the concept of 
“despair” as a possible passionate taxonomy in this sense of the word can be 
further replaced or substituted by other concepts (in case one talks of the 
syntagmatic axis), emerging thus as a consequence of the tensitivity 
occurring in the meantime (which is constantly moveable, because of the 
existence of the subject of doing). 
 If such a situation represents a lack of meaning at the level of the 
deep structure, an action must be undertaken by the active subject. This is so 
for the following reasons: first, treating a child with autism, in terms of the 
initial stages, is not a process which can offer an immediate result, but a 
process that must undergo difficult states of acquiring basic knowledge and 
habits by the child. It is therefore justified to state that the signification 
process in this respect should be comprehended in a gradual and speculative 
basis.  A semiotician should at this instance exemplify one (or some) of the 
therapist’s actions, so as to prove the taxonomic notions, which finally 
contain determined and meaningful feelings as a result.  Prior to our 
exemplifying such special “techniques” by the side of the therapist, one 
should notice that parents’ despair and anxiety—or helplessness—starts 
undergoing a process of a changeability.  
 For instance, developing relational attitudes and feelings about other 
people, is always a good practice on the part of the therapist. This would 
include attempting to hand toys to one another, repetitively, to the extent that 
the child gets accustomed to the action performed. This process, naturally, 
doesn’t look as simple as described. First, it is advisable that two 
communicators exist: one of which should be silent.  The silent 
                                                          
41 The first mentioned process here obviously belongs to the informational processing, 
whereas the other, in accordance with the semiotics of passions, the epistemological, 
therefore hypothetical status of issues.  
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communicator in this respect should semiotically represent the active subject, 
who definitely pushes the child into action. The other communicator (the 
first one, as a matter of fact), should speak to the child, such as “Give me the 
toy!”  If the child, holding the toy in his hands, does not give the toy to the 
therapist, the silent communicator should push him. This action is repeated 
three times. In case the patient performs the action successfully, he or she 
should without doubt be rewarded.  
 As can be seen, the modality notion in such instances (where a child 
with an ASD syndrome is taken as an example) cannot occur instantly, in 
comparison to other semiotically covered social contexts.  The results of 
meaningful units can be noticed at various developmental stages of the child: 
therefore they cannot be permanent. They are instead changeable. Instancing 
the aforementioned example, one can notice the inter-relational attitude 
within the child, such as: recognizing the participants in the game, the giving 
and taking process, and above all socializing, which is fundamental for such 
individuals. Semiotically speaking, all such stages (regarded as 
developmental and/or progressive in terms of such a child’s advancing), are 
regarded as meaningful. (For instance, the child recognizes the toy, the 
therapist, and can relate to them.)  The process of semiosis in this sense of 
the word undergoes different phases of transformability which, being similar 
one to another cannot be intended as final in such a context. In such a 
fashion, one might instance a child’s cry might replace his or her wishing to 
request; or he or she may take a parent’s hand and move it somewhere, or 
towards a certain action; etc. These actions, as a matter of fact, for each such 
action, represent an already applied semiotic process for each such kind of 
passion, respectively.  In conclusion, his/her passions, emerging from a 
modality in action, assisted by the active subject, are already disclosed: want 
to play, want to walk, etc. (but obviously expressed non-verbally, instead of 
verbally). The impassioned subject in this case the parent), having seen such 
a situation (in terms of his/her progressing in the developmental process) 
obtains other attitudes, which transform thus themselves into a state of 
feelings. This can be explained in the following way: first, a parent (now, the 
impassionate subject), starts understanding the child’s actions, - therefore the 
interactional process starts getting applied. Second, owing to the inadequate 
information processing, as we said earlier, another such an attitude 
respectfully gets performed by the parent. He/she starts performing similar 
actions to the child’s one, thus enabling a communication between him/her. 
 To conclude: Such a state of feelings (rendering different taxonomies 
in terms of understanding the child’s wishes, requests and complaints), 
remains within stages of the child’s development. Such kind of a process of 
semiosis obtains meaningful units only at determined behavioral patterns, 
due to the fact they are permanently changeable. 
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